Abstract

Philosophical debates on punishment mainly - and exhaustively - revolve around the traditional dipole “retribution - deterrence”; or, lately, seek for some alternative counterproposal (e. g. the contemporary topic of “restorative justice”). In all sides of the debates, Kant is standardly depicted as the advocate of a traditional, outmost punitive theory of justice; the kind of heritage modern-day “retributivists” seek to reassess, while “preventive” or “restorative” justice defenders aim to abandon. In the present paper, we intend to scrutinize Kant’s own views on crime and punishment, as an integral part of his overall legal-practical philosophy; and, by doing so, to address that Kant is not at all the blind retributivist the above theorists perceive; what is more, he sets a philosophical framework that is able to overcome the flaws of all three, standard conceptions of criminal justice (retributive, preventive and restorative). Finally, in the light of the above, we bring forth the aspects of this Kantian framework, that are useful in assessing current legal systems and required legal reforms.