Rule‐Following and Externalism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140 (2004)
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Abstract

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's “sceptical paradox” about rule‐following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, 1 argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule‐following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.

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Rule-following and externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
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Alexander Miller
New York University

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References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Mind, Language and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975/2003 - Critica 12 (36):93-96.

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