Abstract

The view is widely held that all practical reasoning is instrumental, or means-end. This is a natural position at which to arrive on reflection; for what, one might ask, could possibly be adduced in support of a practical conclusion except its addressing a goal or desire already possessed? And if practical reasoning must proceed from one's desires, it might be thought that while one can reason about how to get what one wants, reasoning about what one wants in the first place is ultimately not possible. ;This dissertation is an attack on the instrumentalist position. Because I believe that the most important reason for the dominance of instrumentalism is the apparent lack of clearly delineated alternatives, the core of the thesis consists of three chapters, each of which presents what I argue is a form of non-instrumental practical reasoning. I argue that learning what the objects of one's desires really are can show them to be incompatible in a way that rationally requires revision. I discuss attending to pleasure as a method of determining what possible objects of desire are intrinsically desirable. And I examine the role of love or friendship in rationally adjusting one's ends. ;The fact that these alternatives have been overlooked or misconstrued for so long requires explanation. I provide a new interpretation of Hume's historically influential arguments for instrumentalism, in which I show how background views about mental content underwrite his understanding of practical reasoning. I then consider what contemporary background views might account for the prevalence of instrumentalism. ;Instrumentalism has had important consequences for moral philosophy and philosophy of mind. I document the former claim by showing how Mill's substantive views depend on his instrumentalist beliefs. I support the latter by arguing that belief-desire psychology is an expression of instrumentalist views, and stands or falls with them. The argument, turning on Moore's paradox, shows that belief-desire psychology cannot be an empirical scientific or proto-scientific theory; it points toward an account of the mental that exhibits the intimate connection between views regarding formal relations of justification and views in moral psychology and philosophy of mind