Abstract

Although most contemporary utilitarians believe that their theory can be held only in a modified form, Sartorius contends that the traditional position, act-utilitarianism, is defensible. He explains the traditional position and defends it against the often made objection that it does not require sufficiently strict adherence to socially valuable legal and moral rules. Act-utilitarianism makes every useful act right, but utility sometimes is maximized if rules are adopted which disallow individually useful violations. If all useful acts are right regardless of any rule they violate, then general rules become nothing more than summary rules or rules of thumb which, in appropriate circumstances, need not be followed. Act-utilitarians need not, according to Sartorius, consider general rules to be only summary ones. Once a rule is seen to be most productive of utility if no exceptions are allowed, the adoption of sanctions to enforce the rule would be justified; when enforced by sanctions, summary rules become genuine social norms because they are capable of directing behavior into desired channels. Besides his account of social norms, Sartorius discusses many other issues related to the utilitarian theory; he criticizes Rawls’ account of distributive justice, provides utilitarian analyses of the obligations to keep promises and obey the law, supports Narveson’s well-known solution to the population problem and discusses how the principle of utility can be vindicated. Because this book deals so clearly with many important issues, it should be read by all those interested in normative ethical theories.—M.G.