Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377 (1983)
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Abstract |
Self-Deception, Properly understood, Is not paradoxical. Although self-Deception involves motivated false belief, It is not properly modeled after "intentional" interpersonal deception. Thus, The major source of paradox is dissolved. Moreover, Even intentional self-Deception need not be paradoxical and there is good reason to believe that a kind of self-Deception which "would" be paradoxical never occurs. Finally, In cases of self-Deception, As in instances of akratic action, There is scope for blame
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Keywords | Belief Epistemology Irrationality Self-deception |
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DOI | 10.2307/2219163 |
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