Abstract

This dissertation provides a critical comparison of three liberal theories of recent issue, the theories of Joseph Raz, John Rawls and David Gauthier. It explains how each theory takes a distinct approach in presenting the idea of a just liberal society; and how these different approaches stem from contrasting conceptions of practical reason and of the structure and content of a conception of the good as individual autonomy. Thus, I show that a feature that relates them as theories of liberalism is the primacy of some conception of individual autonomy. It is the role of practical reason and how it is tied to autonomy that marks the difference. I use this point, first, to explain and evaluate the distinct approach taken by each theory, and, second, to respond to recent depiction of contemporary liberalism as the attempt to eliminate conceptions of the good from political justification. ;Raz presents a communitarian conception of liberal society that is grounded in a perfectionist theory of the value of individual autonomy. By contrast, Gauthier presents a market conception of liberal society that is grounded in the individualistic preference-based assumptions of rational choice theory; given these assumptions, the conceptual basis of a liberal political framework is presented as a rational compromise motivated only by mutually disinterested preferences---hence a want-regarding modus vivendi. Yet a third approach, Rawls' theory of justice as a form of political liberalism presupposes a set of political ideals that is independent of a broader normative framework. It thereby presents a morally ideal political doctrine that at the same time allows a plurality of moral doctrines within it. ;My explanation of these approaches uses the following thematic distinctions: public versus non-public justification; comprehensive versus political conceptions of the good; reasonable versus rational interests; and want-regarding versus ideal-regarding principles