Abstract

The problem of distinguishing perception from hallucination is typically recast as a certain kind of pairing problem: to specify a relation which pairs perceptual experiences with what is perceived. I argue that the pairing problem is unsolvable. Our perceptual ascriptions are too inextricably bound up with pragmatic contextual factors for any solution to the pairing problem to be possible. ;I draw a distinction between two kinds of perception, basic and nonbasic perception. I draw the distinction by appealing to a kind of explanation found in everyday discourse which is neither causal, rational, nor teleological explanation. I label the type of explanation in question 'fact-analysis'. The distinction between basic and nonbasic perception enables me to draw another distinction, a distinction between two questions: what is it to basically perceive something? and what is it to nonbasically perceive something? Attempts to answer one question may have little to do with attempts to answer the other. I focus on and attempt to say what distinguishes basic perception from hallucination. I recast this problem as a restricted version of the pairing problem. The restricted version of the pairing problem avoids the pitfalls of the pairing problem while at the same time capturing what was plausible in the attempt to solve the pairing problem. I attempt to specify a relation which pairs perceptual experiences with what is basically perceived. I claim that the appropriate pairing relation is a certain kind of causal connection. And I attempt to state explicitly the considerations which bear on whether or not a causal connection is appropriate for basic perceiving. One relevant consideration is the belief that perceptual experiences are normally reliable, while hallucinatory experiences are never reliable