Edward MacKinnon
California State University, Hayward
This paper argues that existence claims for theoretical entities must be based on more than their role in one theory. The supplementary evidence should be either observation, whether direct or indirect, or the possibility of detaching the existence claim from one particular theory. A logical schematism for the latter type of support is developed.
Keywords Theories, existence claims
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DOI 10.1016/0039-3681(72)90018-0
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Scientific Realism: The New Debates.Edward MacKinnon - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):501-532.
The Truth of Scientific Claims.Edward MacKinnon - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (3):437-462.

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