Abstract

Inquiry into the problem of universals seems often to focus primarily on the question of the existence of universals, secondarily on the exact nature of the universals whose existence was affirmed or denied, and thirdly on the explanatory merit of the theories in which their existence is postulated. ;It is argued that universals are theoretical entities and that neither logic nor observation may justify claims of their existence. It is argued that some degree of justification of claims for the existence of theoretical entities may come from the comparative explanatory merit of the theory in which they are postulated. As a consequence, questions of the existence of universals appear to be resolvable only by assessing the comparative explanatory merit of the theories in which their existence is postulated. This should produce an inversion in the order of focus of examination in the problem of universals. First, the explanatory merit of the theories in which universals are postulated should be considered, and with this, the specification of the postulated universals should be made precise. Only then can questions concerning existence be considered