How do you know that ‘how do you know?’ Challenges a speaker's knowledge?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83 (2012)
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Abstract

It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion . Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re‐interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood as challenging a speaker's reasons. Consequently, I argue that reasons‐based norms can equally well explain this data

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Citations of this work

Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
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Irksome assertions.Rachel McKinnon & John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.
Can the Knowledge Norm Co‐Opt the Opt Out?Kevin Dorst - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):273-282.

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