McGrath on Moral Knowledge

Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233 (2011)
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Abstract

Sarah McGrath has recently defended a disagreement-based argument for skepticism about moral knowledge. If sound, the argument shows that our beliefs about controversial moral issues do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that McGrath fails to establish her skeptical conclusion. I defend two main claims. First, the key premise of McGrath’s argument is inadequately supported. Second, there is good reason to think that this premise is false.

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Sarah McGrath
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages: A Challenge to McGrath.Sherman Benjamin - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-18.

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References found in this work

The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 13 (2):251-254.
The puzzle of pure moral deference.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.
Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:87-108.

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