Modal realisms

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331 (2006)
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Abstract

Possibilism—the view that there are non-actual, merely possible entities—is a surprisingly resilient doctrine.1 One particularly hardy strand of possibilism—the modal realism championed by David Lewis—continues to attract both foes who seek to demonstrate its falsity (or at least stare its advocates into apostasy) and friends who hope to defend modal realism (or, when necessary, modify modal realism so as to avoid problematic objections).2 Although I am neither a foe nor friend of modal realism (but some of my best friends are!), like many I continue to be fascinated by the doctrine.

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Kris McDaniel
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Theistic Modal Realism II: Theoretical Benefits.Michael Almeida - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12418.
Counterpart theories for everyone.Achille C. Varzi - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4691-4715.
Instantiation as location.Sam Cowling - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):667-682.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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