Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles

New York, NY: Routledge (2021)
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Abstract

It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. Anyone interested in epistemic dilemmas, the nature of justification and evidential support, higher-order requirements, or suspension of judgment will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

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Author Profiles

Matthias Steup
University of Colorado, Boulder
Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University
Kevin McCain
University of Alabama, Birmingham

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