Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090 (2019)

Authors
Nick Hughes
Oxford University
Abstract
This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.
Keywords Epistemic dilemma  Truth norm   Knowledge norm  Epistemic rationality  Action guidance  Epistemic ought-implies-can  Deontic logic
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1639-x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen Aarnio (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.

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