Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that David Hume's philosophy, especially as presented in his Treatise of Human Nature, constitutes a unified whole in which moral philosophy is of a piece with a general scepticism. I take seriously the subtitle of the Treatise, "Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects," but I show that this science of human action has a sceptical basis. This interpretation offers a corrective to both traditional and current readings. ;In calling Hume a 'sceptic', I do not intend to reinforce the reading championed by Thomas Reid and Immanuel Kant. I do not wish to assert that Hume intends to show human reason to be a myth and human beings helpless and ignorant. Instead, I understand Hume's scepticism in light of the tradition of ancient scepticism. Rather than asserting that knowledge is impossible, he shows that any claim to certain knowledge requires a criterion of truth by which knowledge-claims may be judged. The need for this criterion becomes the central sceptical problem; philosophers differ on the nature of this criterion, so a further criterion is required to resolve the dispute, and the knowledge-claims are plunged into a regress. Claims to knowledge are always subject to such sceptical undermining, but experience, being pre-rational, is not. Thus for Hume, knowledge must always be derived from experience, and reason must be directed by passion. ;Hume's philosophy moves us away from knowledge considered by itself toward knowledge considered as a part of human life. As philosophy is for Hume an activity, not a body of knowledge, the philosophy of human action is of fundamental importance to him. Philosophy is unable to answer questions definitively, but the act of philosophical reflection can aid us in making judgments. Hume's scepticism does not render reason useless, but only curtails the ambition philosophers have for it. We are, for example, able to pursue scientific research, but it must be carried out within the boundaries set by a criterion, the establishment of which is a practical problem. Hume's ambition is to construct a science of morals on these sceptical principles