Religious Studies 40 (1):23-42 (2004)
AbstractIn this paper, I consider various arguments to the effect that natural evils are necessary for there to be created agents with free will of the sort that the traditional free-will defence for the problem of moral evil suggests we enjoy – arguments based on the idea that evil-doing requires the doer to use natural means in their agency. I conclude that, despite prima facie plausibility, these arguments do not, in fact, work. I provide my own argument for there being no possible world in which creatures enjoying this sort of freedom exist yet suffer no natural evil, and conclude that the way is thus open for extending the free-will defence to the problem of natural evil
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Similar books and articles
Aquinas’s Miracles and the Luciferous Defence: The Problem of the Evil/Miracle Ratio.Morgan Luck - 2009 - Sophia 48 (2):167-177.
The Problem of Evil: Two Neglected Defences. [REVIEW]Peter Forrest - 1981 - Sophia 20 (1):49-54.
The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):127-136.
Are Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection Compatible? Reply to Mawson.Wes Morriston - 2003 - Religious Studies 39 (4):441-449.
Himma on the Free-Will Argument: A Critical Response.Anders Kraal - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (4):491-503.
Plantinga's Version of the Free-Will Argument: The Good and Evil That Free Beings Do.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):21-39.
Theodicy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2008 - In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
The Problem of Natural Evil I: General Theistic Replies.Luke Gelinas - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):533-559.