Sophia 20 (1):49-54 (1981)

Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence.A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of Evil
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DOI 10.1007/BF02782747
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Divine Perfection.Julian Wolfe - 1975 - Sophia 14 (3):40-41.

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Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):367-392.
Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.Klaas J. Kraay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):355 - 368.
The Problem of Evil.Michael Tooley - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Multiverse and Divine Creation.Mike Almeida - 2017 - Religions 8 (12):1 - 10.
Evil and the Many Universes Response.Jason Megill - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):127-138.

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