Abstract
A theory of evidential probability is developed from two assumptions:(1) the evidential probability of a proposition is its probability conditional on the total evidence;(2) one's total evidence is one's total knowledge. Evidential probability is distinguished from both subjective and objective probability. Loss as well as gain of evidence is permitted. Evidential probability is embedded within epistemic logic by means of possible worlds semantics for modal logic; this allows a natural theory of higher-order probability to be developed. In particular, it is emphasized that it is sometimes uncertain which propositions are part of one's total evidence; some surprising implications of this fact are drawn out.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/49.1.89
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.
Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.

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