‘Global Justice’ and the Suppressed Epistemologies of the Indigenous People of Africa

Philosophical Papers 46 (1):59-84 (2017)
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Abstract

The position that I seek to defend in this article is that the epistemological hegemony that is presently one of the defining characters of the relationship between Africa and the global North is a form of injustice which makes the talk of ‘global justice’ illusory. In arguing thus, I submit that denying the indigenous people of Africa an epistemology that is comparable to epistemologies from other geopolitical centres translates to questioning their humanity which is a form of injustice. I thus proceed to argue that, as a precondition to an authentic discourse on the possibility of ‘global justice’; epistemic injustice must first be challenged and rejected. In so doing, I am defending the position that the acceptance and respect for the diversity of the peoples of this world and their epistemologies is imperative if genuine justice at global level is to be realised.

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References found in this work

The Problem of Global Justice.Thomas Nagel - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):113-147.
Critical Notices.John Rawls - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):241-246.
The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology.Emmanuel Eze - 1997 - In Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 103--140.
Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice.Charles R. Beitz - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2):11-27.

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