Abstract

This study is an examination of the evolution of individual consciousness from German Idealism to Heideggerian Existentialism. It traces the individual ego back to Kant and Fichte, demonstrates how with Hegel it underwent a gathering process, and suggests that with Heidegger it returned to the realm of pre-Socratic unity. ;The investigation begins with an analysis of the groundwork laid by Kant and Fichte, whose conception of the powers of the Transcendental Ego paved the way to phenomenal thought. The system of consciousness established by German Idealism is thus characterized by the presupposition of an unmedaited "I". With Hegel, the conception of consciousness underwent a radical change, demonstrated in his attempt to bring together the multitude of individual minds in his concept of the Absolute Spirit. ;This Hegelian concept, which culminated in Marx's notion of collective consciousness, drew strong criticisms from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who rejected Hegelian objectivism and Cartesian dualism. While Kierkegaard attempted to unify the individual "I" via the power of faith, Heidegger tried to demonstrate that Being was grounded in a primordial unity of subject and object. ;However, the development of the individual "I" was thwarted by the phenomenology of Husserl, who, in Neo-Hegelian fashion, insisted on the mind's objective stance. Again, it was brought back on course through Heidegger's proclamation that the mind does not exist apart from the body. He took the stance that epistemology needed to be examined from a phenomenological standpoint, a view which led him to the conclusion that epistemology actually constitutes ontology. ;The study concludes with an examination of the later Heidegger and his insistence on the authority of language. It suggests that the Heideggerian conception of the subjective individual mind is continued by Hannah Arendt, whose work on metaphor and embodiment provide important insights into contemporary thought. Although Arendt's conception of the mind demonstrates an obvious allegiance to Hegel, she follows in the footsteps of the early Heidegger in her insistence on the phenomenological method