The Pleasures of Thought: A Theory of Cognitive Hedonics

Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (1) (1984)
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Abstract

Proposes a theory of hedonic tone in disinterested states. It is hypothesized that the laws governing the amount of pleasure induced by fairly neutral stimuli are analogous to but not identical with laws governing recognition, memory, and a number of other cognitive phenomena. The amount of pleasure induced by such stimuli is held to be a hyperbolic function of the degree to which the cognitive units coding the stimulus are activated. Difficulties with competing hedonic theories, which led to formulation of the present theory, are noted. A number of predictions derived from the cognitive theory, dealing with simultaneous/instantaneous, serial, or repetitive effects, are discussed. In cases in which empirical data are available, it is shown that these data conform to theoretical predictions. Several counterintuitive predictions—along with supportive data—are presented. A number of untested predictions are also presented.

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