Self-deceiving intentions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):122-123 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Contrary to Mele's suggestion, not all garden-variety self-deception reduces to bias-generated false beliefs (usually held contrary to the evidence). Many cases center around self-deceiving intentions to avoid painful topics, escape unpleasant truths, seek comfortable attitudes, and evade self-acknowledgment. These intentions do not imply paradoxical projects or contradictory belief states.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Definition of Deceiving.James Edwin Mahon - 2007 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2):181-194.
Self-deceivers' intentions and possessions.Michael Losonsky - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):121-122.
Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.
Intentions, goals, and the archaeological record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
56 (#285,378)

6 months
13 (#194,369)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mike Martin
University College London

Citations of this work

Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.
On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
Self-deception and shifts of attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
When Are We Self-Deceived?Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
Motivated belief and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):353 – 369.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references