Self-deceivers' intentions and possessions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):121-122 (1997)
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Although Mele's four sufficient conditions for self-deception are on track insofar as they avoid the requirement that self-deception involves contradictory beliefs, they are too weak, because they are broad enough to include cases of bias or prejudice that are not typical cases of self-deception. I discuss what distinguishes self-deception from other forms of bias.



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Michael Losonsky
Colorado State University

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