On the impossibility of complete non-interference in Paretian social judgements

Journal of Economic Theory 148 (4):1689-1699 (2013)
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Abstract

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.

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Roberto Veneziani
Queen Mary University of London

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