Intersubjektivita v rané filosofii Emmanuela Lévinase

Abstract

Levinas orients his philosophy around a subject that is in constant struggle with its existence. Human existence, understood as a modality of Being, is belied by life's insecurities and sufferings. Being as such is not understood as perfect but as inherently flawed, and that is why a self-sufficient subject is not conceivable. On its own, it cannot ever transcend this condition. As a bearer of radical alterity, the Other offers the only possible way of transcending being. In this work, I explain the reasons behind this as well as the identity of the Other. Thus, ethics will be established as the most important basis of philosophy. Key words: Emmaunel Levinas, existence, Being, alterity, The Other, transcendence, ethics, intersubjectivity, metaphysics, ontology.

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