Ceteris Paribus Conditions as Prior Knowledge: A View from Economics

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:317 - 325 (1988)
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Abstract

We interpret ceteris paribus conditions as the conditions necessary to conducting an experiment. "Ceteris paribus" is thus not a hold-all for whatever we do not know, but a listing of the various decisions taken in moving from a theoretical hypothesis to a testable proposition. The decisions range from modeling in a certain way to selecting a particular functional form or estimation technique. They embody best knowledge/best practice. Debate about the meaning and importance of any test result must center on these decisions; hence they should be laid bare. We give a detailed example from recent macroeconomics, Lucas' test of the natural rate hypothesis.

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