The article points out, in L'Action (1893) and in Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique (1903) by Blondel, a refined characterisation of the relation between the intentional structure of action, as well as the practical significance of logical categories such as possibility, reality, contrariety, and the concept of future. There can be action only if man prepares for reality according to a prospectus of the future; which, in turn, emerges as the spring field of the 'possible' itself, potential space of free intervention. The articles discusses the connections between the transcendental conditions of action, and the notions of possibility and future.
Keywords time  decisión  logics  possibility  Blondel  acción  decision  posibilidad  lógica  action  tiempo
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Principe élémentaire d’une logique de la vie morale.Maurice Blondel - 1903 - Bibliothèque du Congrès International de Philosophie 2:51-85.

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