Abstract

Illocutionary force may be qualified according to Aristotle's classical triadic distinction of logos as a degree of verity, ethos as a degree of credibility or authority and pathos as eloquence or passional intensity. Jakobson 's model of linguistic functions can be understood as operating performatively with greater advantages to pragmatic theory than Searle and Vanderveken's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Consequently, these three dimensions can also be found in the aesthetic as in other linguistic functions proposed by Jakobson when examined from a pragmatic viewpoint. By detecting the direction of fit and establishing a distinction between conversion and constitution, we may better understand not only the difference between the aesthetic and other functions but a variety of instances besides the artistic in which the aesthetic is displayed. Therefore, pathos can be clearly differentiated from the aesthetic as a dimension that may weigh, together with logos and ethos, upon the aesthetic function of an illocutionary act.