Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165 (2009)

Michael Bratman
Stanford University
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert
Keywords Modest sociality  Planning theory of intention  Shared intention  Shared agency  Joint action  Margaret Gilbert  John Searle
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9375-9
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
Normativity in Joint Action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.

View all 46 citations / Add more citations

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