Reflexive conditions on artistic intentions

Abstract

Few dispute the descriptive necessity of intentions in art, little ground has been gained in virtue of such consensus. Intentions matter, but we must know not only which ones matter and why they matter but also the implications of their mattering for art theory writ large. I show that intentionality cannot be exhausted by mere appeals to deliberateness or bare artifactuality. I then argue that only reflexively governed intentions are necessary for art - artistic intentions are communicative intentions. Finally I show how making intentions reflexive accrues myriad art theoretical advantages ranging from interpretation to evaluation of art. Intentions matter because they are communicative. Art becomes language-like and in doing so art gets to matter because language matters.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,813

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Scepticism About Reflexive Intentions Refuted.Maciej Witek - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):69-83.
Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741.
The content of intentions.Elisabeth Patherie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.
Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
Artists' intentions and artwork meanings: Some complications.Stephen Davies - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2):138 - 139.
Intentions and potential intentions revisited.Xiaocong Fan & John Yen - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.
Intentions, goals, and the archaeological record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.
Recognizing communicative intentions in infancy.Gergely Csibra - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (2):141-168.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-12-18

Downloads
24 (#675,021)

6 months
4 (#853,525)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Can we solve the mind-body problem?Colin Mcginn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.

View all 28 references / Add more references