Scientific Explanations

Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):723 - 743 (1973)
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Abstract

There has been much first-rate work done in recent years both by way of criticizing Humean assumptions and explicating alter native concepts of causal explanation and non-logical necessity. Roderick Chisholm early showed the inadequacies of neo-Humean views of explanation in his articles on counterfactual inference, and C. J. Ducasse, Sterling Lamprecht, William Kneale, Nicholas Maxwell, Richard Taylor, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. T. Geach, Milton Fisk, Baruch Brody, Peter Alexander, R. Harré, and William Wallace, among others, have articulated interesting alternative views to the Humean ones they have so trenchantly criticized. We will be concerned with the recent work of Harré and Wallace in this study. Harré has not only launched a fresh attack but has also presented what is probably the most fully developed neorealistic [[sic]] alternative. Wallace’s work is basically historical but has an intentional systematic import also. The books of the two authors are mutually supportive.

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