Does Comparative Animal Cognition Need to Be Saved by Cognitive Modeling?

Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):98-108 (2014)
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Abstract

Colin Allen prescribes cognitive modeling as “the right kind of theory” to use in comparative animal cognition and predicts that unless researchers shift from using conceptual framework hypotheses (“the wrong kind of theory”) to cognitive models, the field will fail to be sustained or develop further. I argue, on the contrary, that the robust development of the field over the past 35 years actually belies Allen's dire prediction. What is more, there is reason to be concerned that if Allen's prescription were wholeheartedly adopted by researchers, it would undermine one of the principal aims of the field: the discovery of the reasons for which animals act. Although cognitive modeling may be a useful tool to use to verify predictions made by conceptual framework hypotheses, I see no reason to think that comparative animal cognition would be, or needs to be, saved by researchers coming to taking cognitive modeling as the right kind of theory to use in the field

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Robert Lurz
Brooklyn College

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