No “Real” Experts: Unexpected Agreement Over Disagreement in STS and Philosophy of Science

Perspectives on Science 26 (6):722-735 (2018)
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Abstract

If an outsider should get an interest in the study of "Social Epistemology," that person would immediately find that there are in fact two identically labeled programs. One is represented by the journal of the same name and belongs to the field of Science and Technology Studies, the other is an offshoot of analytical philosophy, and is represented by such philosophers as Alvin Goldman. Not only will the interested outsider discover this, they will also find two different articles titled "Two Kinds of Social Epistemology" that point out this fact, one published in the philosophical journal Episteme and the other in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply...

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References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Moral disagreement and moral expertise.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-108.

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