Decision-Making Capacity and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):117-122 (2011)
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Abstract

Principle 2 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) requires that decision-making capacity should be assumed, unless there is conclusive evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to the contrary (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005). In his article “The Paradox of the Assessment of Capacity Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005,” Ajit Shah (2011) raises the concern that the new Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS), introduced through the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2007), conflict with this principle (henceforth, the principle of presumed capacity) because, in practice, they will encourage the routine assessment of capacity even in the absence of any positive evidence of diminished capacity ..

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Peter Lucas
University of Central Lancashire

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