Abstract

This dissertation is a comparison of Karl Marx's historical materialist and Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogical critiques of the "rational society" in light of attempts by twentieth-century social theorists concerned with the relationship between capitalist economics and ascetic psychology to synthesize them. ;I initially examine structural and substantive similarities in Marx's and Nietzsche's theories of man and history. Structurally, both explore the historical origins of social "givens," opening the previously unquestioned and unquestionable to question. Substantively, both posit dialectical histories, i.e., that men create themselves historically and that their expanding powers functionally determine social organisms and social change. Both argue that the "rational society" has become dysfunctional for those expanding human powers and that it must be overcome. ;Yet, although both have dialectical histories, each has a different historical dialectic. I explain how each criticizes the "rational society" as dysfunctional from his different perspective. Marx, who views history as the expansion of man's productive powers, argues that capitalism, liberalism, and modern ideology, alienate those productive powers. Nietzsche, who views history as the expansion of man's will to power, criticizes those social structures because they deny that will to power. ;I not only explain their different perspectives on the "rational society," but I also pursue a Marxian critique of Nietzsche and a Nietzschean critique of Marx. I argue that, although each questions, neither fully escapes his "given" reality: Marx criticizes capitalist economics in the name of rational, social production and thereby expresses his ascetic reality; Nietzsche criticizes ascetic psychology in the name of skepticism, individualism, and play and thereby expresses his bourgeois reality. ;I conclude that, while each perspective is incomplete and initial similarities do suggest syntheses, Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques of the "rational society" are ultimately contradictory, not complementary. I suggest that the contradictions I expose pose profound problems for twentieth-century attempts at synthesis, and that social theorists who want to interpret and to change reality must regain logical coherence. In short, they must choose Marx or Nietzsche: science or skepticism, socialism or individualism, production or play