Vom Unwesen der Lüge

Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2016 (1):7-28 (2016)
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Abstract

Lying in the sense of declaring as true what you believe to be false takes a special position within ethical discourse concerning truthfulness and the virtues and vices of communication. None of the many other ways in which people lack truthfulness is considered nearly as vicious as lying. However, in everyday life our attitude towards lying is far from consistent insofar as we tend to take both an absolutist and a relativist position towards lying. The article shows that our inconsistency derives from several philosophical traditions which have developed widely different concepts and moral attitudes with regard to lying. And with respect to the challenges of present life it is argued that instead of bending all our thoughts on lying, we should rather follow Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams in distinguishing the virtues of veracity we should cultivate in the different areas of modern life.

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Maria-Sibylla Lotter
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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