Induced by intake of the psychedelic substances LSD, psilocybin, DMT and mescaline, psychedelic experiences have been extensively described by subjects as entailing a most unusual increase in the scope and quality of their consciousness. Accordingly, psychedelic experiences have been widely characterised as an “expansion of consciousness.” This article poses the following question, as yet unaddressed in contemporary philosophy and the tradition of phenomenology: to what exactly does “expansion of consciousness” refer as a general characterisation of psychedelic experiences, and what role (...) might attention play therein? On the basis of Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenology of attention, the following thesis is presented: (a) “expansion of consciousness” refers to a particular restructuration of consciousness in psychedelic experiences. (b) This occurs by means of certain extreme transformations in direction, scope, mode and degree of attention. In order to explicate this thesis, the characteristic features of psychedelic experiences that pertain to expansion of consciousness and attention are first systematically identified from a survey of subject reports. Second, it is demonstrated that the few previous attempts to understand expansion of consciousness in terms of attention as a filter/reducing-valve, spotlight or zoom-lens each fail to explain how consciousness is structured in psychedelic experiences. Third, it is argued that psychedelic expansion of consciousness is a general restructuration of consciousness by means of extreme attentional transformations. In conclusion, brief consideration is given to the question of whether psychedelic expansion of consciousness can have epistemic and ethical value for life. (shrink)

In contemporary discourses, it has become common sense to acknowledge that humans and some species of animals, from their very inception, are embedded in social and intersubjective contexts. As social beings, we live, interact, communicate, and cooperate with others for a range of different reasons: sometimes we do so for strategic and instrumental reasons, while at other times it is purely for its own sake. Moreover, in one way or another, we encounter others not only as rational but also as (...) sentient beings; our interactions with others are shaped by reason, though not exclusively so. They are also affected by our emotions, feelings, moods, and environments. In this way, we seek understanding both for and by others. We are able to recognize, interpret, and categorize others’ expression and behavior; in turn, we express our emotions, desires, and motivations to act towards others and hope that others will react adequately and appropriately. Empathy is usually understood as the capacity to apprehend others’ mental states—especially emotions. In recent decades, it has become one of the most widely discussed concepts, especially in the philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. Although there is a vast array of publications on the topic of empathy, a number of controversies have persisted, particularly in relation to how the process, outcome, and value of empathy should be understood. One recent debate concerns the question of whether we directly perceive others’ mental states or whether we rather imagine their perspective. Another central discussion is ongoing regarding empathy in respect of narratives and fictional characters. The aim of this Special Issue is to interrelate these two branches—fiction and imagination—and to examine the role of imagination in the empathic process, especially in relation to the thesis of direct perception of others’ mental states. Despite the wealth of recent research into empathy that has emerged from a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives, there is still no consensus about the nature and role of imagination and whether empathizing with fictions should be categorically or just gradually distinguished from empathizing with real persons. (shrink)

This article examines the role of moods in aesthetic experience by focussing on film. It considers specifically the function of moods in relation to narrative and aesthetic perspectives which a film provides and which recipients are invited to adopt. I distinguish superficial transitory moods from profound enduring ones. This differentiation is important with regard to the question why moods in film matter and why they are different from emotions. I will focus on Lars von Trier’s film “Melancholia” and claim that (...) the moods of the leading characters can at one and the same time count as moods and perspectives on the world. Their moods are strongly connected to how they perceive their world, evaluate it, and “are” in the world. By being put into a mood that assails human beings holistically, viewers get acquainted with a perspective of a fictional character in an encompassing manner that includes mind and body. However, it will be discussed whether the viewers feel profound or superficial moods when engaging in the moods of the film and the characters and whether they are infatuated or can remain aesthetic distance. (shrink)

Expanding the debate about empathy with human beings, animals, or fictional characters to include human-robot relationships, this paper proposes two different perspectives from which to assess the scope and limits of empathy with robots: the first is epistemological, while the second is normative. The epistemological approach helps us to clarify whether we can empathize with artificial intelligence or, more precisely, with social robots. The main puzzle here concerns, among other things, exactly what it is that we empathize with if robots (...) do not have emotions or beliefs, since they do not have a consciousness in an elaborate sense. However, by comparing robots with fictional characters, the paper shows that we can still empathize with robots and that many of the existing accounts of empathy and mindreading are compatible with such a view. By so doing, the paper focuses on the significance of perspective-taking and claims that we also ascribe to robots something like a perspectival experience. The normative approach examines the moral impact of empathizing with robots. In this regard, the paper critically discusses three possible responses: strategic, anti-barbarizational, and pragmatist. The latter position is defended by stressing that we are increasingly compelled to interact with robots in a shared world and that to take robots into our moral consideration should be seen as an integral part of our self- and other-understanding. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the potential of aesthetic experience for a change of perspective. It is one of the most important sources of the possibility, reflection and extension of perspectives. More precisely, according to the thesis presented here, it is the aesthetic experience, which as aesthetic implies the change of perspective, the reversal or alteration of accustomed, possibly false perspectives and the pointing out of new perspectives. A decisive difference to our other practices, in which we (...) also engage with other perspectives, is that the aesthetic is a play with perspectives, in which we as recipients and, in a certain sense, participants are epistemically and morally relieved. The medium film is discussed as a paradigmatic medium of such aesthetic change of perspective. (shrink)

Narrative Empathie liegt dann vor, wenn der empathische Nachvollzugsprozess der (emotionalen, epistemischen) Situationen anderer Personen oder fiktiver Figuren durch ein Narrativ, das heißt eine sinnzusammenhängende Erzählung, ausgelöst und strukturiert wird. Der Aufsatz knüpft an den phänomenologischen Ansatz von Empathie als direkte Wahrnehmung an, vertritt aber die These, dass gerade bei Narrativen die Imagination und die Perspektiveneinnahme hinzukommen müssen, damit retrospektiv, prospektiv oder gegenwärtig die Situation des Anderen und seiner individuellen Perspektive vergegenwärtigt und verstanden werden kann. Der narrativen Empathie wird ein (...) indirekter ethischer Wert zugeschrieben: Durch das empathisch anschauliche Anteilnehmen am Narrativ des Anderen und einen damit verbundenen Perspektivwechsel können auch unsere eigenen Perspektiven erweitert werden; dies kann zu besserem Verständnis ungewohnter Sichtweisen führen und moralische Gefühle und Handlungen motivieren. Narrative empathy is the complex re-presentation of an (emotional, epistemic) situation of another person or a fictional character by means of a narrative, which is a structured and perspectively colored context of meaning. The paper sympathizes with the phenomenological approach of empathy as direct perception though at the same time arguing that in cases of (literary, filmic, dramatic) narratives imagination and perspective-taking is also needed in order to be able to comprehend and to understand the other’s situation retrospectively, prospectively or at present. According to the author, narrative empathy has an indirect moral value: the vivid empathetic participation in the other’s narrative and the process of perspective-taking can help to broaden one’s horizons; this can lead to a better understanding of unfamiliar and other worldviews and motivate moral emotions and actions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 3 Seiten: 480-487.

Toleranz ist ein Grundprinzip des Liberalismus. Sie ist eng verknüpft mit den Prinzipien der Freiheit und der Autonomie des Individuums. Unabhängig von der historischen Entwicklung des Konzepts, lässt sich Toleranz allgemein als das Gewähren-Lassen divergierender Meinungen, Weltanschauungen und Lebensweisen definieren. Negativistisch formuliert: Niemandem wird vorgeschrieben, wie er/sie zu leben hat, vorausgesetzt, er/sie schadet mit seiner/ihrer Meinung oder Lebensweise nicht anderen. Ursprünglich als ein Prinzip der Religionsfreiheit entstanden, ist sie heute ein grundlegendes moralisches und politisches Prinzip pluralistischer und demokratischer Gesellschaften. Moralisch (...) ist das Prinzip in dem Sinne zu verstehen, dass es die Überzeugung zur Grundlage hat, dass andere Personen ein Recht auf die freie Ausübung ihrer Meinung, Weltanschauung und Lebenseinstellung haben. (shrink)

In Philosophy, there are two central questions concerning the phenomenon of lying: First, what is lying? And, secondly, what is morally wrong with lying? Those who deal with the second question usually ask if, when, and why lying can be morally justified. Hence, the liar and his reasons stand in the limelight. But what does actually happen when someone is lying, particularly to the addressee of the lie? What is harmed by lying? This paper goes the other way around and (...) focuses on the addressee. It defends the thesis that two principles are concerned: the respect of the person and his/her autonomy on the one hand. And trust on the other hand. Furthermore, the paper is an attempt to answer the question why we consider some lies worse than other lies: Namely, if something essential for our self-conception is involved. Here, different kinds of interpersonal relations and trust – thin and thick – play a central role. (shrink)

Empathie ist in den vergangenen Jahren zu einem der zentralen Begriffe in Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft geworden. Steht er fur die einen fur das Vermogen von Personen oder gar einer ganzen Gesellschaft, fremden Perspektiven, Erfahrungen und Gefuhlen sensibel und nachfuhlend zu begegnen, ist Empathie fur die anderen ein leerer Begriff oder ein fehlgeleitetes Prinzip. In diesem Band wird "Empathie" kritisch, historisch und semantisch aus asthetischen Blickwinkeln betrachtet: Untersucht werden die Funktion und der Wert der Empathie in unserem Umgang mit Musik, Literatur, (...) Film und Sprache. Braucht es Empathie, um sich in Klange, Melodien, Performer einzufuhlen? Gehen wir empathisch mit fiktionalen Charakteren mit? Wie reagieren wir empathisch gegenuber Sprache und ihren Rhythmen? Was genau heisst in all diesen asthetischen Kontexten eigentlich Empathie? Der Band enthalt eine differenzierte Zusammenstellung aus aktuellen wissenschaftlichen und kunstlerischen Perspektiven zum Thema. (shrink)