Abstract

The later Wittgenstein's examination of rule-following is presented and shown to be essential to his analyses of language and logic. Various accounts of how it is that rules are able to determine a course of correct action are analyzed in the light of certain apparently paradoxical aspects of rule-following. One account, according to which understanding a rule is identified with the possession of an ability, is shown to resolve these apparent paradoxes. This account is generalized to demonstrate how the meanings of linguistic expressions, which are argued to be rule-governed, are understood. On this basis linguistic understanding is shown to be an ability. ;This view is expanded to explain Wittgenstein's account of verbal and ostensive explanations, as well as his technical notion of a criterion. A distinction is further introduced between two types of generality; one involving rules, the other empirical generalizations. Many of the later Wittgenstein's criticisms of philosophers' use of formal logical methods are argued to rest upon his belief that such methods conceal this difference. Finally, alternative interpretations of Wittgenstein's account of rule-following, as well as alternative treatments of logical necessity, are critically examined