Time, Embodiment and the Self

Ashgate (2000)
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Abstract

Beginning with a sustained argument against the tenseless theory of time and against McTaggart's A series/B series distinction, the author of this essay goes on to provide a non-paradoxical, tensed, phenomenologically-based account of the going on or taking place of events in time that escapes the paradoxes endemic to passage as understood via the A series/B series distinction.

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Citations of this work

The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.

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