Abstract

The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge. It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a theory of knowledge may be obtained by developing such analyses of first-order, concrete, empirical, propositional knowledge. Third, that the final arbiter of the correctness of such analyses is to be the carefully examined intuitions of the epistemologist. The paper attacks each aspect of this framework on the ground that this methodology will precisely not give us knowledge. In passing, comparisons are drawn with arguments which led to the demise of phenomenalism. The paper concludes with remarks about realism / anti-realism and consensus / disagreement in analytic epistemology. The paper recommends that we seek to develop theories of knowledge rather than analyses; and defends the position that such theories will precisely not be analyses.