Abstract

How is it possible for a society to maintain internal peace and social cooperation when its members are deeply divided on moral and religious questions which they regard as of overriding importance, and are unwilling to tolerate activities which offend against their values? This, I argue, is the question to which Hobbes's political philosophy is addressed. ;The reigning interpretation of Hobbes's philosophy takes Hobbes to be offering a purely prudential argument for obedience to any de facto government--an argument that depends upon the assumption that people value their self-preservation above all else. On the contrary, I argue, Hobbes fully recognized that people can, and often do, care more for such things as fulfilling their duties to God, and satisfying the demands of morality than they do about their own preservation; and that it is precisely these transcendent interests which, when their satisfaction is frustrated by the actions of the state or of opposing factions within a society, motivate people to act in socially disruptive ways. ;If then, one wants, as Hobbes did, to ensure the perpetual maintenance of peaceful social order, one must demonstrate that socially cooperative behavior is contributory to the satisfaction of men's transcendent interests, as well as to their prudential interests. Hobbes's project thus takes the form of an attempt to provide each of his readers with what that person can regard as a sufficient reason for adhering to a principle of political obligation which, if generally and widely adhered to, could ensure the perpetual maintenance of effective social order. ;I argue that this interpretation of Hobbes's political philosophy better satisfies reasonable criteria for interpretation than do any alternative interpretations: it better fits Hobbes's text, it better accounts for the structure of Hobbes's text, and it makes Hobbes's argument more coherent, plausible, and powerful than do any alternative interpretations. On this interpretation Hobbes's political philosophy is seen to be more than just a rather unsophisticated argument against anarchy, or in favor of government as a mere modus vivendi; it becomes an illuminating early attempt to develop a stable, principled solution to the problems posed by a collapse of consensus on values, interests, and ends