The Polysemy View of Pain

Mind and Language 38 (1):198-217 (2023)
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Abstract

Philosophers disagree about what the folk concept of pain is. This paper criticises existing theories of the folk concept of pain, i.e. the mental view, the bodily view, and the recently proposed polyeidic view. It puts forward an alternative proposal – the polysemy view – according to which pain terms like “sore,” “ache” and “hurt” are polysemous, where one sense refers to a mental state and another a bodily state, and the type of polysemy at issue reflects two distinct but related concepts of pain. Implications with respect to issues in philosophy of pain are also drawn.

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Michelle Liu
Monash University

Citations of this work

How to Think about Zeugmatic Oddness.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-24.
Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication.David Liebesman & Ofra Magidor - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness.Kevin Reuter - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account.Jada Wiggleton-Little - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.

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