Abstract

The Lectures on the History of Philosophy taught by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel between 1805 and 1830 – initially in Iena, then in Heidelberg and, later, in Berlin – are perceived by some scholars as the landmark that indicates the birth of the scientific History of Philosophy. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon that the same authors who take Hegel’s Lectures as the precursors of the scientific History of Philosophy will not restrain themselves from attributing to them a fundamental flaw: the circular character of their theoretical foundations. Because it seemed to us useful to formulate and settle this question concerning the circular character of the foundations of the Hegelian theory of the History of Philosophy, we decided to critically question the “Introduction” of the Lectures. Therefore, we established as the goal of this paper the definition and the critical discussion of the assumed principles which lay the ground for the Hegelian theory of the History of Philosophy, so as to determine the solidity of their problematisation. From the achievement of this goal in the course of our investigation has emerged the thesis that we shall uphold here, to wit: Hegel’s History of Philosophy is grounded in a teleological hermeneutic, which robs it of its sought for historiographical scientificity, because the End that orientates the interpretation – the Idea in its Logical Concept – is never shown to be immanent and inherent to the historical process. The single demonstration that Hegel offers in the “Introduction” to the Lectures reveals itself as a circular demonstration and, therefore, as an invalid one. Remaining as a non demonstrated supposition, the End of the History of Philosophy appears manifestly to be the result of an interpretative projection.