Abstract
It is a remarkable fact about the development of medical ethics from the 1960s until today that there has been a dramatic shift from a position where it was taken for granted that the physician knows best, to a position where much greater emphasis is put on the patient’s treatment preferences. This shift is evident with regard to physician attitudes towards disclosing a cancer diagnosis. For example, in 1961, a survey of cancer physicians showed that almost 90% of the physicians reported that their usual policy was not to tell their patients that they had cancer . The survey was repeated in 1979, and it showed a complete reversal in attitudes over this 20-year period. 90% reported that their usual policy was to tell their patients that they had cancer .One common way of justifying the new approach is to claim that patients have a right to make their own treatment decisions, referring to the basic value of patient autonomy. However, it is immediately obvious that physicians should not respect all choices made by patients. Consider the following case: A thirty-eight-year-old man with mild upper respiratory infection suddenly developed severe headache, stiff neck, and high fever. He went to an emergency room for help. The diagnosis was pneumococcal meningitis, a bacterial meningitis almost always fatal if not treated. If treatment is delayed, permanent neurological damage is likely. A physician told the patient that urgent treatment was needed to save his life and forestall brain damage. The patient refused to consent to treatment saying he wanted to be allowed to die .Very few, if any, physicians would respect this person’s treatment choice. The reason is that this patient is not competent to make his own decisions. Respect for autonomy only requires that the choices of patients who are competent to make their own decisions are honoured. Judgements about which patients are competent to make their own decisions therefore become crucial