Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35 (1996)
AbstractSolutions to the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness must accept conscious experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers suggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I find basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brain processes causally involved in the development of conscious experience appear to meet Chalmers’ requirement. Even more directly, I had previously proposed a hypothetical ‘conscious mental field’ as an emergent property of appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjective experience and a causal ability to modulate some neural processes. This theory meets all the requirements imposed by the ‘hard problem’ and, significantly, it is experimentally testable
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience.Amy Kind - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
NCC Research and the Problem of Consciousness.Michael Pauen - 2021 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 2.
Similar books and articles
Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Eugene Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
The Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness: A Cartesian Perspective.Frederick B. Mills - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):119-40.
Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.
The Hardness of the Hard Problem.William S. Robinson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25.
What Would It "Be Like" to Solve the Hard Problem?: Cognition, Consciousness, and Qualia Zombies.Greg P. Hodes - 2005 - Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.
The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation.Brian D. Earp - 2012 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 29:63-92.
The Easy Problems Ain't so Easy.David Hodgson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75.
Rethinking Nature: A Hard Problem Within the Hard Problem.Gregg H. Rosenberg - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88.