Chance and counterfactuals

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405 (2005)
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Abstract

Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic

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John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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