The Problem of Ignorance

Ethics 130 (2):211-227 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Holly Smith (2014) contends that subjective deontological theories – those that hold that our moral duties are sensitive to our beliefs about our situation – cannot correctly determine whether one ought to gather more information before acting. Against this contention, I argue that deontological theories can use a decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the moral importance of information. I then argue that this approach compares favourably with an alternative approach proposed by Philip Swenson (2016).

Similar books and articles

Is there a duty to remain in ignorance?Iain Brassington - 2011 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (2):101-115.
Deontology defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-09

Downloads
328 (#36,186)

6 months
29 (#43,139)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chad Lee-Stronach
Stanford University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references