Ethics 130 (2):211-227 (2020)
AbstractHolly Smith (2014) contends that subjective deontological theories – those that hold that our moral duties are sensitive to our beliefs about our situation – cannot correctly determine whether one ought to gather more information before acting. Against this contention, I argue that deontological theories can use a decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the moral importance of information. I then argue that this approach compares favourably with an alternative approach proposed by Philip Swenson (2016).
Similar books and articles
Subjective Deontology and the Duty to Gather Information.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):257-271.
The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting.Holly M. Smith - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):11-38.
In defense of a constructive, information-based approach to decision theory.M. R. Yilmaz - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):21-44.
How Can a Deontological Decision Lead to Moral Behavior? The Moderating Role of Moral Identity.Zhi Xing Xu & Hing Keung Ma - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 137 (3):537-549.
Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for Objective Imprecise Information.Raphaël Giraud & Jean-Marc Tallon - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (1):23-32.
Could Ross’s Pluralist Deontology Solve the Conflicting Duties Problem?Cecilia Tohaneanu - forthcoming - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 59.
Asymmetries in Information Processing in a Decision Theory Framework.Luís Santos-Pinto - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (4):317-343.
Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.
Why Rational Deontological Action Optimizes Subjective Value.Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:182-193.
Is there a duty to remain in ignorance?Iain Brassington - 2011 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (2):101-115.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads