Recent literature has examined the problem facing decision makers with bounded awareness, who may be unaware of some states of nature. A question that naturally arises here is whether a value of awareness, analogous to value of information, can be attributed to changes in awareness. In this paper, such a value is defined. It is shown that the sum VOA +\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$+$$\end{document} VOI is constant and, except for scale (...) effects, independent of the choice set. It follows that the larger is VOA, the smaller is VOI. This point is illustrated for a simple two-state case, then proved for general classes of compact convex choice sets, and for alternative interpretations of the concept of unawareness. (shrink)

The participation of vulnerable patients in clinical research poses apparent ethical dilemmas. Depending on the nature of the vulnerability, their participation may challenge the ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, or justice. On the other hand, non-participation may preclude the building of a knowledge base that is a prerequisite for defining the optimal clinical management of vulnerable patients. Such clinical uncertainty may also incur substantial economic costs. We present the participation of pre-menopausal women with atrial fibrillation in trials of novel oral (...) anticoagulant drugs as a case study. Due to their non-participation in pivotal trials, it is uncertain whether for them, the risks that are associated with these drugs are outweighed by the advantages compared with conventional treatment. We addressed the question whether research of this new class of drugs in this subgroup would be appropriate from both, an ethical as well an economic perspective. We used the method of specifying norms as a wider framework to resolve the apparent ethical dilemma, while incorporating the question whether research of oral anticoagulants in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified on economic grounds. For the latter, the results of a value-of-information analysis were used. Further clinical research on NOACs in premenopausal women with atrial fibrillation can be justified on both, ethical and economic grounds. Addressing apparent ethical dilemmas by invoking a method such as specifying norms can improve the quality of public practical reasoning. As such, the method should also prove valuable to committees that have formally been granted the authority to review trial protocols and proposals for scientific research. (shrink)

This article addresses the value of information that affects the ambiguity faced by a decision maker. Our analysis is applied to the case of a farmer whose production can be damaged by a pest attack with unknown probability, this damage being reduced if the farmer decides to use a pesticide. Early warning systems have precisely been implemented in many countries to help farmers avoid inappropriate decisions in terms of pesticide use. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, how farmers (...) value these systems. We propose a two-state self-insurance model in which an α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha$$\end{document}-MaxMin Expected Utility farmer may use pesticides that reduce the loss in the accident state while incurring a cost in both states. Her decision to self-insure or not depends on risk and ambiguity attitudes. We compile and compare the value of two types of information leading to a reduction of ambiguity and analyze their properties with respect to ambiguity attitude. Both types of information are valued positively if the farmer is ambiguity averse. We conduct a framed field experiment in which farmers and agricultural students have to decide whether or not to apply pesticides depending on risk, ambiguity and the associated monetary gains resulting from pesticide cost. The experimental findings support the theory. The average value of information among all participants is between €0.9/ha and €3.3/ha depending on the information gain. (shrink)

What is the most general common set of attributes that characterises something as intrinsically valuable and hence as subject to some moral respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy and therefore rightly to be disrespected in itself? This paper develops and supports the thesis that the minimal condition of possibility of an entity's least intrinsic value is to be identified with its ontological status as an information object. All entities, even (...) when interpreted as only clusters of information, still have a minimal moral worth qua information objects and so may deserve to be respected. The paper is organised into four main sections. Section 1 models moral action as an information system using the object-oriented programming methodology (OOP). Section 2 addresses the question of what role the several components constituting the moral system can have in an ethical analysis. If they can play only an instrumental role, then Computer Ethics (CE) is probably bound to remain at most a practical, field-dependent, applied or professional ethics. However, Computer Ethics can give rise to a macroethical approach, namely Information Ethics (IE), if one can show that ethical concern should be extended to include not only human, animal or biological entities, but also information objects. The following two sections show how this minimalist level of analysis can be achieved. Section 3 provides an axiological analysis of information objects. It criticises the Kantian approach to the concept of intrinsic value and shows that it can be improved by using the methodology introduced in the first section. The solution of the Kantian problem prompts the reformulation of the key question concerning the moral worth of an entity: what is the intrinsic value of x qua an object constituted by its inherited attributes? In answering this question, it is argued that entities can share different observable properties depending on the level of abstraction adopted,and that it is still possible to speak of moral value even at the highest level of ontological abstraction represented by the informational analysis. Section 4 develops a minimalist axiology based on the concept of information object. It further supports IE's position by addressing five objections that may undermine its acceptability. (shrink)

In my paper I will focus my attention on some philosophical aspects of the Information Ethics displayed by Luciano Floridi. Floridi’s Information Ethics has the methodological merit of providing the interpretation of the Informational Turn with a solid philosophical basis, the roots of which deserve a careful investigation. In this perspective, I will analyse a key question, which is essential not only from a theoretical but also from a practical (moral, political and legal) point of view, i.e. whether (...) or not Floridi’s construction of information is consistent with a pluralistic conception of Being. (shrink)

In my paper I will focus my attention on some philosophical aspects of the Information Ethics displayed by Luciano Floridi. Floridi’s Information Ethics has the methodological merit of providing the interpretation of the Informational Turn with a solid philosophical basis, the roots of which deserve a careful investigation. In this perspective, I will analyse a key question, which is essential not only from a theoretical but also from a practical point of view, i.e. whether or not Floridi’s construction (...) of information is consistent with a pluralistic conception of Being. (shrink)

Solutions to the problem ofprotecting informational privacy in cyberspacetend to fall into one of three categories:technological solutions, self-regulatorysolutions, and legislative solutions. In thispaper, I suggest that the legal protection ofthe right to online privacy within the USshould be strengthened. Traditionally, inidentifying where support can be found in theUS Constitution for a right to informationalprivacy, the point of focus has been on theFourth Amendment; protection in this contextfinds its moral basis in personal liberty,personal dignity, self-esteem, and othervalues. On the other hand, (...) the constitutionalright to privacy first established by Griswoldv. Connecticut finds its moral basis largelyin a single value, the value of autonomy ofdecision-making. I propose that an expandedconstitutional right to informational privacy,responsive to the escalating threats posed toonline privacy by developments in informationaltechnology, would be more likely to find asolid moral basis in the value of autonomyassociated with the constitutional right toprivacy found in Griswold than in the varietyof values forming the moral basis for the rightto privacy backed by the Fourth Amendment. (shrink)

Background:Moral courage is defined as courage to act according to one’s own ethical values and principles even at the risk of negative consequences for the individual. In a complex nursing practice, ethical considerations are integral. Moral courage is needed throughout nurses’ career.Aim:To analyse graduating nursing students’ moral courage and the factors associated with it in six European countries.Research design:A cross-sectional design, using a structured questionnaire, as part of a larger international ProCompNurse study. In the questionnaire, moral courage was assessed with (...) a single question (visual analogue scale 0–100), the questionnaire also covered several background variables.Participants and research context:The sample comprised graduating nursing students (n = 1796) from all participating countries. To get a comprehensive view about graduating nursing students’ moral courage, the views of nurse managers (n = 538) and patients (n = 1327) from the same units in which the graduating nursing students practised were also explored, with parallel questionnaires.Ethical considerations:Ethical approvals and research permissions were obtained according to national standards in every country and all participants gave their informed consent.Results:The mean of graduating nursing students’ self-assessed moral courage was 77.8 (standard deviation 17.0; on a 0–100 scale), with statistically significant differences between countries. Higher moral courage was associated with many factors, especially the level of professional competence. The managers assessed the graduating nursing students’ moral courage lower (66.5; standard deviation 18.4) and the patients slightly higher (80.6; standard deviation 19.4) than the graduating nursing students themselves.Discussion and conclusions:In all countries, the graduating nursing students’ moral courage was assessed as rather high, with differences between countries and populations. These differences and associations between moral courage and ethics education require further research. (shrink)

The analysis of the nexus between the value of information and risk is examined for sequential decisions with different degrees of future commitment, as e.g. environmental decisions. We find that in the linear case a riskier environment in general will increase the value of information. This result will be extended in the separable case to decreasing and increasing stochastic returns to scale. An example shows the ambiguity in the general case.

The notion of the value of information is discussed. The value one attributes to information is determined by the result of its reception by an open nonequilibrium system. Qualitative reasoning shows that the concept of value of information makes sense only in nonequilibrium situations, and is directly connected with the nonredundancy of information. In biology it is the value and not the amount of information that is important. The value of (...) information is especially high if there are instabilities in the system; these are connected with the notions of purpose and of freedom of will. The notion of selective value, introduced by Eigen in the theory of the prebiological evolution of macromolecules, is discussed. The amount of information in various codons is calculated and the conventional definition of its value is given based on the determination of the danger of the replacement of one amino acid by another with a different value of hydrophobicity. It is shown that the relative probability of transversion is considerably lower than that of transition. As most nonsense mutations are transversions, the genetic code provides decreased probability for the most dangerous mutations. It is shown that the information of the codonUGG(Trp) is highest in both amount and value. (shrink)

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view (...) that epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

Various hypotheses about the importance of psycho-neural concomitants are reviewed and their implications discussed for the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness -- especially, as viewed by cognitive and ecological psychology. In Ecological Psychology, where the subjective-objective dichotomy is repudiated, these concepts are without foundation, and are replaced by informed awareness, which is argued to play an important, perhaps, indispensable role in goal- directed actions and thus to have survival value. The significance of informed awareness is illustrated in several (...) real- world goal-directed tasks. (shrink)

In his discussion of minimax decision rules, Savage presents an example purporting to show that minimax applied to negative expected utility is an inadequate decision criterion for statistics; he suggests the application of a minimax regret rule instead. The crux of Savage’s objection is the possibility that a decision maker would choose to ignore even “extensive” information. More recently, Parmigiani has suggested that minimax regret suffers from the same flaw. He demonstrates the existence of “relevant” experiments that a minimax (...) regret agent would never pay a positive cost to observe. On closer inspection, I find that minimax regret is more resilient to this critique than would first appear. In particular, there are cases in which no experiment has any value to an agent employing the minimax negative income rule, while we may always devise a hypothetical experiment for which a minimax regret agent would pay. The force of Parmigiani’s critique is further blunted by the observation that “relevant” experiments exist for which a Bayesian agent would never pay. I conclude with a discussion of pessimism in the context of minimax decision rules. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between Savage's sure thing principle and the value of information. We present two classes of results. First, we show that, under a consequentialist axiom, the sure-thing principle is neither sufficient nor necessary for perfect information to be always desirable: specifically, under consequentialism, the sure thing principle is not implied by the condition that perfect information is always valuable; moreover, the joint imposition of the sure thing principle, consequentialism and either one of (...) two state independence axioms does not imply that perfect information is always desirable. Second, we demonstrate that, under consequentialism, the sure thing principle is necessary for a nonnegative value of possibly imperfect information (though of course the principle is still not sufficient). One implication of these results is that the sure thing principle, under consequentialism, plays a somewhat different role in ensuring dynamic consistency in decision making under uncertainty than does the independence axiom in decision making under risk. (shrink)

The paper aims at a perspicuous representation of Isaac Levi's pragmatist epistemology, spanning from the 1967 classic "Gambling with Truth" to his 2004 book on "Mild Contraction". Based on a formal framework for Levi's notion of inquiry, I analyse his decision-theoretic approach with truth and information as basic cognitive values, and with Shackle measures as emerging structures. Both cognitive values figure prominently in Levi's model of inductive belief expansion, but only the value of information is employed in (...) his model of belief contraction. I argue that the former model is more successful than the latter. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for "normative hedging" based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning *empirical* truths is instrumentally valuable. We conclude with a brief comment on "metanormative regress.".

Classical logic of formal provability includes Löb’s theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intuitions about the inferential behavior of informal provability (in informal mathematics) seem to invalidate Löb’s theorem and validate reflection (after all, the intuition is, whatever mathematicians prove holds!). We employ a non-deterministic many-valued semantics and develop a modal logic T-BAT of an informal provability operator, which indeed does validate reflection and invalidates Löb’s theorem. We study its properties and its relation to known provability-related paradoxical arguments. We also (...) argue that T-BAT is a fairly sensible candidate for a formal logic of informal provability. (shrink)

In the contemporary debate about values, information technology constitutes an important source of hard ethical questions and in turn is a testing area for the moral theory of values. Values are difficult to track down and yet there are a number of inquiries starting from economics, social psychology, ethics, and political theory that engage with the cognitive, epistemic, and moral status of values. This paper is a contribution to an account of values in connection with information technology. It (...) argues that information technology may provide further support to a theory of values that is able to embrace the transformative effects of the digital revolution. In particular, it is plausible that a non-ideal reflection on digital wrongdoings is better equipped to produce substantive knowledge about values that have been undermined than a different approach focused on ideal guiding values. Moreover, information technology overcomes the vaunted fact/value dichotomy and supports the fact/value entanglement. As the principal concern of data-mining and machine-learning communities are ways of remedying a remarkable number of biases and conformism in techno-social systems, it is within the bounds of possibility to supplement the non-ideal theory from this new practical angle. I therefore call for a fully conceptual consideration of values drawing on the experience and reflection that is growing in the field of information technology. (shrink)

Sometimes we believe that others receive harmful information. However, Marschak’s value of information framework always assigns non-negative value under expected utility: it starts from the decision maker’s beliefs – and one can never anticipate information’s harmfulness for oneself. The impact of decision makers’ capabilities to process information and of their expectations remains hidden behind the individual and subjective perspective Marschak’s framework assumes. By introducing a second decision maker as a point of reference, this paper (...) introduces a way for evaluating others’ information from a cross-individual, imperfect expectations perspective for agents maximising expected utility. We define the cross-value of information that can become negative – then the information is “harmful” from a cross-individual perspective – and we define (mutual) cost of limited information processing capabilities and imperfect expectations as an opportunity cost from this same point of reference. The simple relationship between these two expected utility-based concepts and Marschak’s framework is shown, and we discuss evaluating short-term reactions of stock market prices to new information as an important domain of valuing others’ information. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Signaling Games and Repeated Play The True Belief Game as a Signaling Game Nash Equilibria and ESS in the True‐Belief Signaling Game The Value of Knowledge Appendix Acknowledgments References.

Drawing on the core values of western civilization, the author refines the counterparts in Chinese civilization, summarized as four core principles: duty before freedom, obedience before rights, community before individual, and harmony before conflict. Focusing on guoxue or Sinology as the basis of his approach, the author provides detailed explanations of traditional Chinese values. Recent scholars have addressed the concept of guoxue since the modern age, sorting through it and piecing it together, which has produced an extremely abundant range of (...) information. However, given that the concepts and theories involved have been left largely unanalyzed, this book develops a theoretical treatment of them in several important respects. First, it analyzes the mindset of guoxue, examining the dominant ideas and values of the era from which the term "guoxue" arose, focusing on its connection to early changes and trends in society and culture, and distinguishing three key phases of development. Past scholars mainly had in mind the range of objects studied in guoxue when defining it, and what this book underscores is the meaning of guoxue as a modern body of research. Secondly, it assesses several phases in the modern evolution of the body of guoxue research from the beginning to the end of the 20th century, id est, ending with the later phase of the National Heritage movement. Third and lastly, the book explores the various main modes of modern guoxue, which correspond step by step with the evolutionary phases of guoxue research. (shrink)

Many philosophers are skeptical about the scientific value of the concept of biological information. However, several have recently proposed a more positive view of ascribing information as an exercise in scientific modeling. I argue for an alternative role: guiding empirical data collection for the sake of theorizing about the evolution of semantics. I clarify and expand on Bergstrom and Rosvall’s suggestion of taking a “diagnostic” approach that defines biological information operationally as a procedure for collecting empirical (...) cases. The more recent modeling-based accounts still perpetuate a theory-centric view of scientific concepts, which motivated philosophers’ misplaced skepticism in the first place. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Where we are When truth at a world depends on more than how that world is A diagram to give the key idea A language where truth at a world is, by stipulation, a function of which world is actual On looking for examples of two–dimensional sentences in the English of the folk How should we approach questions like, How do we use the word “water”? and, How do we use the word “Gödel”? More on (...) the evidential role of intuitions about possible cases What information do we impart with the word “water”–first pass With enemies like these, who needs friends?16 What information do we impart with the word “water”–second pass The issue about narrow content18 Proper names and information (I) Proper names and information (II) Coda. (shrink)

Sissela Bok's1 and Torbjörn Tännsjö's2 writings on trust and informed consent were sources of inspiration for my article.3 It is gratifying to have a chance to respond to their thoughtful comments.Bok concurs with my scepticism that the ‘trust-promotion argument for informed consent’ can successfully generate commonsense morality's full set of informed consent norms. But she finds that argument even more wanting, perhaps so wanting as to be unworthy of critical attention. What she seems to find particularly objectionable is the fact (...) that the argument treats all social trust as valuable. For Bok, misplaced trust in health practitioners who are deceitful or violate patients’ other rights lacks any value whatsoever. There isn't even a pro tanto duty in favour of promoting it.My own inclination is to say that nearly all trust has some social value, if only thanks to its tendency to promote social stability or its tendency to promote medical adherence . But often, trust also tends to generate bad outcomes, and in many cases of misplaced trust, that tendency will make its value negative on balance. Still, in my view, …. (shrink)

Parents influence the development of their offspring in many ways beyond the transmission of DNA. This includes transfer of epigenetic states, nutrients, antibodies and hormones, and behavioural interactions after birth. While the evolutionary consequences of such nongenetic inheritance are increasingly well understood, less is known about how inheritance mechanisms evolve. Here, we present a simple but versatile model to explore the adaptive evolution of non-genetic inheritance. Our model is based on a switch mechanism that produces alternative phenotypes in response to (...) different inputs, including genes and non-genetic factors transmitted from parents and the environment experienced during development. This framework shows how genetic and non-genetic inheritance mechanisms and environmental conditions can act as cues by carrying correlational information about future selective conditions. Differential use of these cues is manifested as different degrees of genetic, parental or environmental morph determination. We use this framework to evaluate the conditions favouring non-genetic inheritance, as opposed to genetic determination of phenotype or within-generation plasticity, by applying it to two putative examples of adaptive non-genetic inheritance: maternal effects on seed germination in plants and transgenerational phase shift in desert locusts. Our simulation models show how the adaptive value of non-genetic inheritance depends on its mechanism, the pace of environmental change, and life history characteristics. (shrink)

This paper reports on the findings of the first stage of a research project that experiments with the use of laddering technique in an attempt to enhance understanding of the influence of values in the behaviour of HRM professionals. Laddering has been chosen because it allows flexible, systematic investigation of aspects of ethics and people management which have hitherto been difficult to clarify. It also provides the opportunity to undertake both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data obtained. The research (...) design incorporates two phases – a questionnaire and a laddering interview; it involves a sample of respondents drawn from HRM practitioners participating in the CIPD Professional Qualification Scheme. In comparing the results obtained from each phase of the research, it is clear that the laddering interviews have enabled more detailed information to be elicited and more specific goals to be identified. The authors believe that laddering can provide valuable additional insight into ethical practice, behaviour and goals. (shrink)

This paper attempts to establish the epistemological import and limits of informed consent in clinical research. It points out that informed consent is a necessary requirement in clinical research because it ensures adequate participation of care receivers in issues relating to their health. Besides ensuring that care receivers have knowledge of whatever medical intervention they are consenting to, informed consent, as an ideal, provides assurance that care receivers and others are neither coerced nor deceived. While the question of the (...) class='Hi'>value of informed consent in health care delivery is not so much controverted, in contest is the question of whether or not complete and wholly specifically informed consent can indeed be realized in medical intervention. Two orientations are identified in this debate. One insists that an individual will be able to make an informed decision and make reasonable choices amongst alternatives when fully informed. The other orientation sees as an epistemic illusion, achieving full informed consent, and rather opts for informed request. This paper examines this debate by clarifying the notion of informed consent, its components and its nexus with knowledge. The position of the paper is that informed consent is not only an ethical ideal in clinical research and health care; it is also an epistemic virtue that must be continuously strived towards. This paper establishes that health care receivers can only have an epistemic claim of their medical situation if all requirements of informed consent in health care delivery such as provision of adequate information, the risk and benefits of treatment, avoidance of vague/ambiguous statements, voluntariness, etc. are met. (shrink)

This paper reports on the findings of the first stage of a research project that experiments with the use of laddering technique in an attempt to enhance understanding of the influence of values in the behaviour of HRM professionals. Laddering has been chosen because it allows flexible, systematic investigation of aspects of ethics and people management which have hitherto been difficult to clarify. It also provides the opportunity to undertake both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the data obtained. The research (...) design incorporates two phases – a questionnaire and a laddering interview; it involves a sample of respondents drawn from HRM practitioners participating in the CIPD Professional Qualification Scheme. In comparing the results obtained from each phase of the research, it is clear that the laddering interviews have enabled more detailed information to be elicited and more specific goals to be identified. The authors believe that laddering can provide valuable additional insight into ethical practice, behaviour and goals. (shrink)

The case describes researchers who are seeking ethics guidance on communicating with participants in a phase-1 COVD-19 vaccine trial about FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccines (Wilfond, Duenas, and Johnson 2023). The researchers want help choosing among three options they have identified for encouraging participants to obtain one of the authorized vaccines. We argue that research ethics consultants should consider going beyond this question to address another ethics concern the researchers might have overlooked.

What are management gurus? Who are they? Why do we need them? This informative and practical guide analyses the value to be gained from reading the gurus, sets the growth of gurudom in context and traces the lines of development of the major schools of thought from their beginnings to the present day.

In the United States and elsewhere, there is substantial controversy regarding the use of race and ethnicity by police in determining whom to stop, question, and investigate in relation to crime and security issues. In the ethics literature, the debate about profiling largely focuses on the nature of profiling and when (if ever) profiling is morally justifiable. This essay addresses the related, but distinct, issue of whether states have a duty to collect information about the race and ethnicity of (...) persons stopped by police. I argue that states in the U.S. do have such a duty on the grounds that such information collection would help secure the value of persons’ human rights against discrimination and unfair policing. Nonetheless, a large number of states do not require it. I begin by distinguishing rights from the value of rights, and arguing that under certain conditions persons have claims to the value of rights themselves, and that states have duties to secure that value. I then turn to the issue of profiling and offer the value of rights argument in favor of information collection about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police. (shrink)

This study is an extension of our recent ethics research in direct marketing and information technology. In this study, we investigated the relationships among core organizational values, organizational ethics, corporate social responsibility, and organizational performance outcome. Our analysis of online survey responses from a sample of IT professionals in the United States indicated that managers from organizations with organic core values reported a higher level of social responsibility relative to managers in organizations with mechanistic values; that managers in both (...) mechanistic and organic organizations which were perceived as more socially responsible were also perceived as more ethical; and that perceived ethical attitudes and social responsibility were significantly associated with organizational performance outcome measures. Our article discusses research premises, conceptual framework, hypotheses, research methodology, data analysis, recommendations for further research, and conclusions. (shrink)

In this article, I develop three conceptual innovations within the area of formal metatheory, and present a computer program, called Reconstructor, that implements those developments. The first development consists in a methodology for testing formal reconstructions of scientific theories, which involves checking both whether translations of paradigmatically successful applications into models satisfy the formalisation of the laws, and also whether unsuccessful applications do not. I show how Reconstructor can help carry this out, since it allows the end-user to specify a (...) formal language, input axioms and models formulated in that language, and then ask if the models satisfy the axioms. The second innovation is the introduction of incomplete models (for which the denotation of some terms is missing) into scientific metatheory, in order to represent cases of missing information. I specify the paracomplete semantics built into Reconstructor to deal with sentences where denotation failures occur. The third development consists in a new way of explicating the structuralist notion of a determination method, by equating them with algorithms. This allows determination methods to be loaded into Reconstructor and then executed within a model to find out the value of a previously non-denoting term (i.e. it allows the formal reconstruction to make predictions). This, in turn, can help test the reconstruction in a different way. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions about additional uses the program may have. (shrink)

The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? (...) -- Achievement without achievement -- Back to the value problem -- Contra virtue epistemology -- Two master intuitions about knowledge -- Anti-luck virtue epistemology -- Interlude : is anti-luck virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Diagnosing the structure of knowledge -- Back to the value problem -- The final value of achievements -- Understanding -- Understanding and epistemic luck -- Understanding and cognitive achievement -- Back to the value problem -- Two potential implications of the distinctive value of understanding thesis -- The traditional analytical project and the central tension -- Knowledge, evidence, and reasons -- Concepts versus phenomena -- The way ahead -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Broad and narrow competence -- Avoiding reduction -- Perpetual-recognitional abilities -- Broad and narrow competence -- Avoiding reduction -- Perceptual knowledge and justified belief -- Closure and doxastic responsibility -- Knowledge from indicators -- Recognitional abilities again -- Detached standing knowledge -- Back to knowledge from indicators -- Taking stock -- Why knowledge matters -- Approaching the epistemology of testimony -- Telling and informing -- Acquiring true beliefs and acquiring knowledge through being told -- Access to facts about knowledge -- The modest route -- Fool's knowledge -- The distinctive value of knowledge -- Fool's justification -- Arguing from illusion -- The regress of justifications -- Transparency and knowledge -- Transparency and entitlement -- On trying to do without transparency -- Transparency and luminosity -- Non-sensible knowledge -- Self-knowledge -- Non-sensible knowledge of action -- The two dimensions -- The distinctive value of knowledge of action -- Non-observational knowledge -- Practical knowledge and intention -- Practical knowledge and direction of fit. (shrink)