Abstract

As the example of evil, the Holocaust was the focus of Arendt's judgments in her proto-philosophical works. In its particularity it became a new standard of judgment with which to judge other historical events. However, in the particularity of its evil, the Holocaust could not become the focus of the activity of her thinking. It did, however, become the point of departure for the activity of philosophizing. ;In conclusion, I have offered criticisms on Arendt's approach to the problematic of freedom and evil. ;This examination indicates that, for Arendt, the activities of thinking and judging survived the shattering of concepts of thought and standards of judgment by the event of the Holocaust. ;Since Arendt's reflections on the activity of judging exist only in fragmentary form, I have elucidated them through an examination of her practice of historical judgment. I have suggested that Kant's notion of exemplary validity, which Arendt refers to briefly, enables us to elaborate the status of the Holocaust in Arendt's reflections. In Arendt's works, the Holocaust is the historical example, i.e., "a particular which in its particularity reveals a generality which could not otherwise be described." ;Between these two confrontations there is a restatement of the problematic which original human action poses for philosophical. In her first confrontation, Arendt says that cognitional thought is unable to grasp the originality and contingency of human action. In her second confrontation, this problematic is expressed as the conflict between the thinking and willing ego. ;Part Three of this essay turns from the sequential exposition of Arendt's reflective confrontations with the Holocaust to an examination of her justification and elaboration of the approach she had taken to historical events. In particular, I examine her claim that the Holocaust is an "unprecedented event" which breaks down our previous categories of thought and standards of judgment. ;This essay is also structured on the evidence that Arendt had two significant, and explicit, "confrontations" with the event of the Holocaust: during the Second World War and during the Eichmann trial. Parts One and Two of this essay deal respectively with the proto-philosophical and philosophical works associated with the periods of each of those two confrontations. ;Throughout these two confrontations Arendt's notion of human freedom emerges as the locus of the problematic of the relationship between the Holocaust and philosophical reflection. It is the locus of the problematic of evil. Arendt characterizes freedom as the human capacity to originate, or begin, a new series in time. This is the anthropological basis of original human action and "new" or "unprecedented" historical events. ;My approach has been to examine Arendt's works in chronological sequence in a way that respects the non-linear dynamic of her reflections. I have considered her philosophical works and her proto-philosophical works as an ensemble. However, I have restricted myself to a more philosophical critique of her reflections. ;This essay is structured on the evidence that the event of the Holocaust was, implicitly or explicitly, central in Arendt's reflection. The developmental exposition of this essay demonstrates that the Holocaust was an important focus in Arendt's proto-philosophical works, and a key point of departure in her more properly philosophical works. ;The purpose of this essay is to examine the relationship between the event of the Holocaust and the philosophical reflections of Hannah Arendt