Involuntary Evil and the Socratic Problem of Double Ignorance in Proclus

International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 9 (1):27-53 (2015)
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Abstract

In hisCommentary on the AlcibiadesiProclus often discusses and links the peculiar epistemological category of “double ignorance” with evil and grievous error. To understand this more fully, the following analyzes Proclus’ concept of double ignorance, its characteristics and its causes. Markedly, due to his understanding of double ignorance, Proclus offers a response to the “Socratic” idea that no one willingly errs as this particular category of not-knowing enables him to explain how individuals, despite desiring and in some sense knowing the good, fail or ‘miss the mark’ in articulating and doing the good.

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Danielle A. Layne
Gonzaga University

Citations of this work

Proclus.Christoph Helmig - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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